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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE
Senator is entirely sincere in offering his
reservation. I appreciate the complimentary but undeserved remarks which
he has made about me. I did not wish
to leave the impression with the Senator that I felt the only desirable effect
of the treaty would be a slight relief of
cold war tensions. If both sides live up
to the treaty-and, as the Senator
knows, we have our protection in that if
the other side cheats, we can withdraw
at any time-it will have this oLher important effect in reducing atmospheric
pollution. This I know is of deep concern to this country and to all those
interested in the health and wel!are of
future generations.
The proliferation of nuclear weapons
and the increased pollution of the atmosphere which can go on if we continue
to test and if other countries continue
to test is a matter of very deep distress
throughout this country. Hopefully, the
signing of a partial nuclear test ban
treaty would put an end to that. I recognize that we have no complete assurance of it. I feel that that is one of the
important factors, in addition to the relaxation of tensions.
Mr. GOLDWATER. I agree with the
Senator.
Mr. MANSFIELD rose.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President,
does the Senator from Montana wish
to have me yield to him?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
should like to have the floor in my own
right.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I
yield the floor.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
intend to yield to the distinguished Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS], but
before doing so I wish to tell the Senator from Arizona that I have a few
comments tl:> make on the remarks he
has just completed.
I yield to the Senator from New York
[Mr. JAVITS].
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I thank
the majority leader.
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THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
preface my remarks by stating that the
Senator from Arizona [Mr. GoLDWATER]
has made some tho-aghlful commf'nts on
the desirabiltty of clarification of certain
points in the treaty through floor interpretations and declarations of understanding. Much of this has already
been done, of course, through Presidential statements and in other official pronouncements by his duly authorized
agents, and in the report of the committee.
There is always room for improvement. Further clarification may come
during floor discussion, and I would hope
that the Senator from Arizona would
draw on his long military and legislative
experience to make a contribution in
this connection. I am sure that he wlll.
I had the opportunity to read on the
ticker th1s morning what the Senator
from Arizona was to say. I had the opportunity to listen to his speech and to
read it. I would bring to the attention of
the Senate some comments, which may
or may not be of interest to this body.
I note that on the first page of his
speech, the Senator from Arizona states:
Tha.t obligation begins with consideration
o! ways In which the treaty, now riddled with
doubts, ca.n be strengthened and made
acceptable beyond any doubt.

"Beyond" is underlined.
There is nothing in the world today
which is beyond any doubt. Everything
is doubtful. Everything is changeable.
The best we can do is to try to keep up
with the changes as they occw·.
On the same page the Senator refers
to "President Eisenhower's wise warning," wh1ch I think was taken into consideration by the Committee on Foreign
Relations. I recall to the Senate a letter
dated April 13, 1959, which President
Eisenhower wrote to Mr. Khrushchev,
which stated:
The United States strongly seeks o. lasting
a.g:reement for the discontinuance of nuclear
weapons tests.

Note, Mr. President, the phrase
"strongly seeks."
There is a question about the "ambiguous drafting" of the treaty, and the statements and that "no broadly experienced
international lawyer was present • • •
nor was there a military representative
on hand to help assure against those disadvantages of which the Joint Chiefs of
Staff have spoken and because of which
they have proposed such elaborate subsequent safeguards."
I must take exception to the implication in the Senator's remarks that there
has been inad,.equate military or legal
consideration of the treaty. Countless
lawyers from the departments concerned,
and countless officers from the armed
services, along with diplomats, have been
involved in the process of forming the
treaty from the outset, which, as the
Senate will recall, dates from the second
administration of President Eisenhower.
The names of Arthur Dean, one of the
foremost international lawyers of our
times, who was used quite often by the
late great Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, and former President Eisenhower; of James Wadsworth, who was

likewise used by that administration and
by this; of John McCloy, who has been
used by both admJnistratlons; along with
those of General Taylor and of Mr. Harriman come readily to mind. There are
many, many others.
Speaking of the attitude of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, I belleve it should be
brought out in no uncertain terms that,
with the four safeguards which the Committee on Foreign Relations agreed to,
they have come out unqualifiedly for the
treaty, provided such safeguards are contained thercm.
I must take strong exception to the
proposal of the Senator from Arizona
that there be formal reservations to the
treaty. If we wish to kill the treaty, that
Is the best and surest way to do it. I
remind Senators that more than 80 nations have already ratified the treaty.
In the course of the distinguished
Senator's speech. another statement is
of interest, in which he says:
We cannot be lsolullonlsts In this nuclear
world.

No truer words were ever spoken.
Then the Senator says:
The distinguished Senator from Louisiana.
(Mr. LoNe] has echoed that warning and has
suggested that he will seek to have a reservation formally attached to the treaty.

The distinguished Senator from Louisiana stated, after he voted in the committee against reporting the treaty, that
his mind was not made up, and that if
the arguments were amenable to his
way of th1nking during the course of the
debate, he might very well vote for this
treaty.
I am sure that the able Senator from
Arizona. has an open mind and is willing
to listen to the debate on the fioor of
the Senate, since hearings were held
over a long period of time by three committees of the Senate, in total numbering more than one-third of the Members
of the Senate.
The Senator from Arizona. also says
the Soviets would gain from the treaty.
I do not believe the Soviets would gain
from the treaty. I believe if anyone
gains from It, it will be this country as
much as the Soviet Union. The world
as a whole would gain from the treaty.
At the bottom of page 4 there is the
following statement:
Its risks cannot be justified I! we are
only to give In and get nothing.

It seems to me that the Senator, on
the basis of his attendance at the hearIngs--and I know he was there, because
I was there with him-should know that
the editorial opinions of the vast majority
of the Nation's newspapers are in favor
of the treaty. Certainly he knows we
will get something out of the treaty.
Certainly he knows that those who have
studied the treaty on both sides of the
aisle, Members of both parties, have
made clear the potential of the treaty,
first, to eliminate the spiraling race toward an illusory "ultimate weapon."
Second, eliminate the deadly clouds of
fallout that have affected the people of
every country on the face of the earth.
Third, provide a means of containing
the spread of super weapons to many
countries which do not now have them.
If anyone has any idea that this ad-
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ministration exerted any kmd or pressure on anyon<' In favor of the treaty,
he ought to do a llttle second thmkm
The question was asked In op('n session I! any pressure were exerted. The
answer was unqualifiedly, "No."
The whole premise of this treaty. as
it now stands. Is that It Is at least as
much In the Interests of the people of
the United States as it is of the Russians or any other nation.
The whole premise of the Senator from
Arizona's remarks is that we are getting the short end of the stick In this
treaty. It is difficult to see how that
premise can be accepted unless-First. The Senator from Arizona ft>els
that It Is not In our Interest to seek t.o
ban those Russian tests, as well as our
own, which are already a cause of gross
birth malformations not unlike those
produced by thalidomide and of unnecessary bone cancer and leukemia cases
In this country and elsewhere, tests
which, If they continue indlscrtmina.tely, could bring about a vast Increase In
this damage to health .and to the genetic
integrity of the people of the United
States. If the Senator from Arizona
sees no advantage to the United States
in stopping Russian tests of this kind,
then his premise might have some val!dity and his conclusions that we need
reservations to the treaty might be understandable.
Further. this treaty assumes that the
fears and hostilities as between ourselves
and the Russians are so great that any
effort to bring about a more peaceful
situation must start from the humblest
and the most narrow beginnings of mutual interest. But the Senator from
Arizona apparently believes that we can
hurry up the process, that instead of 1
stitch in time to save 9, we can take
2 and save 18, or 3 and save 27. I do not
have that k!nd of conftdence In the Russians. It would seem to me that the
world w!ll be very fortunate, indeed, if
it can take this one stitch at this time
and make it stick, let alone saving the
9 or the 18 or the 27.
I appreciate the Senator's eagerness
for peace with the Russians and his
anxiety to dissolve other problems in
Russian-United States relations along
with this one of limiting nuclear testing.
But the Senator must know that any
reservation to this treaty will require
Its renegotiation not only with the Soviet
Union but with over 80 other nations
It is easy to see what will happen. We
wlll ask for a reservation that the Russians withdraw from Cuba and the Russians will then ask that the United
States withdraw from Greece or Turkey
or Berlin or Vietnam or somewhere else
And Egypt will ask for an Israeli withdrawal from Palestine. and Israel will
ask for a comparable Egyptian withdrawal, and Pakistan and India will ask
for a mutual withdrawal from Kaslunir
In the end, Mr. President, about half
the world will ask reservations of one
kind or another to the effect that the
other half withdraw from the earth, and
since the feeling will be mutual, we will
be back where we started from-with
each half urging the disappearance of
the other. even though a nuclear dlsastRr
will provide for the extinction of both.
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Of course It would be a wonderful thing
to get the Russians out or CUba. But
I can think of no more unsatisfactory
way of doing it than to assure the continuance of the assault of nuclear testing on the health of the families of the
United States or to assure the continuance of the total anarchy which now prevails In the elusive search for security
through unrestricted bomb testing. The
reservations proposed by the Senator
from Arizona would appear to me to pro\'ide this dual assurance.
The reservations sound most plausible.
Mr. President, but they would not get
the Russians out of Cuba. Who does
not wish to get the Russians out of
Cuba? Who docs not wish to assure
the defense of the Nation? But these
reservations will do neither. The world
is not that simple. And because it is
not, these reservations would be-although I am sw·e the Senator from Arizona did not mean them that way-a
mischievous toying with the health and
the hopes of the people of the United
States, hopes which have been sustained
by both President Eisenhower and President Kennedy. for a saner and more mature world through curbs on nuclear
testing.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I am delighted to
yield.
Mr. GOLDWATER. First, let me say
that the bulk of the distinguished majority leader's comments are of a nature
that will bP thoroughly debated during
the discussion of the test ban treaty. It
is not my purpose today to argue the
merits or demerits of my proposal. I
think that can be done at the time of the
presentation of the reservation; and it
will be done whenever it is proper.
I wish to comment on one observation
the Senator made on my remarks when
I said that "Such ambiguous drafting is
certainly natural and understandable inasmuch as no broadly experienced international lawyer was present." The Senator from Arizona would agree that many
eminent lawyers. in both administrations, have been consulted. I used the
words "was present." Nor was there a
military representative on hand. I would
be more critical of that ~han I would be
of the lack of international lav:yers.
There was present, I believe, a military
representative from the Judge Advocate
General's Office, but he was not a man
well versed in military weapons, tactics,
and so forth. I believe the Senator from
Montana was present in the committee
hearing when this was brought out.
Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct.
Mr. GOLDWATER. I think he was
present also when I asked the Secretary
of Defense if he had discussed the proposed treaty with all the members of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. He assured me he
had. The Senator will remember that
later General LeMay, in answer to a
straight question, said it had never been
discussed with him.
I do not inject that comment as a criticism against the Secretary or in support
of the general. I merely wish to
strengthen my point that there is grave
military concern over this matter that

will be very well expressed in the report
now completed by the Preparedness Subcommittee, which will be out on Monday, a report which I believe every Senator should read, because it approaches
this question !rom the military side and
purposely avoids the political side.
I said the distinguished Senator from
Louisiana has echoed that warning. I
merely go on what I read in the press,
that he was interested in introducing
such a reservation.
The matters which the S enator has
brought up are good subjects which
must be thrashed out on the floor. I
believe that all Senators owe it to the
country to be present in the Senate during the debate. The report of the Preparedness Subcommittee makes no recommendation. The committee states
that the decision is up to the minds of
Senators themselves. I believe that
when Senators have heard all sides discussed, they will be able. to vote intelligently
Mr. MANSFIELD. I appreciate the
remarks made by the distinguished Senator from Arizona. He has made a contribution, and in the debate the subject
will be discussed in more detail.
Also, if the report of the Preparedness
Subcommittee is as good as its report
on Cuba, which was issued a few months
ago, and which I thought was an extremely good report, it likewise will be
a distinct contribution.
I did not mean to imply that the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LoNG] said he
might not bring up a reservation. All
I wished to say was that he bad indicated that he had not definitely made
up his mind, and that he would wait until all the evidence was in, and then
would make hls decision.
So far as the military chiefs of staff
not being present in the negotiations is
concerned, I remind my colleagues in
the Senate that our Government is a
government of civilians; that, as far as
the military are concerned, they are
present to give advice and counsel, but
not to make policy; they are present to
carry out orders.
I would refer my colleagues to the last
speech made by President Eisenhower,
which was one of his great ~;;pceches, before he voluntarily retired from office,
and in which he raised a. warning flag
about some of these matters, which
would seem to indicate that the military
under certain conditions, along with industry, might have too much to say in
the plans of this country, and which I
would hope all Senators, regardless of
party, would take t0 heart.
I wish to express my appreciation to
the distinguished Senator from Arizona.
He always makes a. contribution. I know
personally that he is deeply worried
about the treaty and its implications.
I know personally that he still has an
open mind in consideration of the treaty,
debate on which wUl begin next Monday,
and which will continue for some time.
I should like· to say to the Senator
from Arizona that the treaty wlll not be
rushed through. Every Member of the
Senate will have an opportunity to speak.
and every side will be heard. At the conclusion of the debate every Senator in
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his own conscience will have to make up
his own mind and render t1is own de-

cislon and make his own report to his
own people.

